As the contemporary Sino-American rivalry unfolds, marked by competition between the great powers “in virtually every domain of global power,” the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is mounting a challenge to U.S. power and influence in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Recognising that the stakes for U.S. interests are high, in a context where the PRC ranks as the United States’ “most consequential strategic competitor,” Washington is pursuing a diplomatic strategy to address that challenge. Wary of an ascendant China in CARICOM and clear-eyed about their respective interests, India and Japan are also taking measures to strengthen ties with this region.
The Dragon’s Foothold
Following the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the Anglophone Caribbean country of Guyana in 1972, Beijing’s influence has grown considerably in CARICOM — a regional grouping that comprises fourteen mostly Anglophone sovereign, small states. Over the last decade and a half, the PRC has seized opportunities for momentous trade and economic investment in the Caribbean. In addition, it is also taking steps to put its stamp on security assistance in the region.
The PRC has gained a foothold in the Caribbean, attaining significant influence through the use of economic statecraft.
And as Taipei’s diplomatic backing in the Caribbean wanes, the PRC is pressing its advantage in this region — traditionally deemed to be the United States’ so-called backyard. This is the case even as China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) — which is largely responsible for driving the PRC’s penetration of the region in “economic, diplomatic and political” terms — has steadily come under scrutiny. Undeterred by such criticism, Beijing is playing up the benefits of the BRI for the Caribbean.
The United States has been caught geopolitically flat-footed by Beijing’s “growing presence in the region.” As a result, the BRI has opened such states up to U.S. pressure on key security and technology-related issues. Analysts assess the BRI in the region to be a “grave threat” to U.S. national security. CARICOM member states, however, seemingly prefer “a common bilateral China-CARICOM policy of economic and political engagement.”
High Stakes for the United States
That the Caribbean was a blind spot for successive U.S. administrations, spanning the 2000s and 2010s, is hardly surprising, given that U.S. foreign policy was fixated on the ‘war on terror’ for years after 9/11.
And yet, as America’s third border, the Caribbean remains an important region for U.S. interests. For the Caribbean, too, relations with the U.S. are historically significant, as are present day ties across several dimensions: diasporic, socio-cultural, security-related and commercial/trade, and more.
Washington, however, has been slow off the mark in “calibrat[ing] its foreign policy toward the region to optimize the interests not only of the U.S. but also of the Caribbean.” The outgoing Biden Administration made strides in correcting this shortcoming, inter alia, via its National Security Strategy, released in October 2022. It points to an American worldview, outlining “three broad U.S. priorities for the Western Hemisphere — expanding economic opportunities, strengthening democracy, and building security — that reflect long-standing continuity with U.S. policy for the [Americas].”
Indeed, the Biden Administration has gone all in on partnering with Caribbean governments “in defense of … shared values, and to improve Caribbean resilience in all aspects — economy, security, and democracy — so that the people of the Caribbean and the United States enjoy prosperity, health, and freedom.”
In so doing, Washington continues to prioritise the PRC and is trying to ensure that Beijing does not have complete sway in the Caribbean.
Such too is the outlook of some other powers, such as India and Japan.
Counterresponses from Two Asian Powers
New Delhi has gone about making this calculation in deference to India’s grand strategy, which, according to an academic, has been “characterised by an interest-based outlook, emphasising pragmatic and dynamic engagement with the international system, free from dogmatic ideologies or moralising rhetoric.”
India (a top tier Asian power) and Japan (a middle power) contend with “shifting power dynamics in the [Indo-Pacific] region,” and this has profound implications for their strategic interest amidst the PRC’s expansive power plays.
This is the case even as New Delhi and Beijing are moving “toward rapprochement [against the backdrop of] a vexing border dispute.” India and China also play leading roles in the BRICS+ grouping, which is a formidable challenger to the postwar international order.
But that relationship remains complicated. As analysts note, “Beijing’s expanding presence across the Indo-Pacific presents a common strategic challenge for Canberra, New Delhi, Tokyo, and Washington.”
Little wonder that New Delhi and Tokyo are heavily involved in counterweight diplomacy in that region — e.g. balance of power-driven, Quad minilateralism. This is in a context of Washington’s hardening “balance of power politics” toward the PRC’s attempts to undermine U.S. primacy and interests in the region. That approach partly behoves New Delhi and Tokyo, for example, to play stronger roles in regions farther afield — like the Caribbean.
The recently held Second CARICOM-India Summit and the Eighth CARICOM-Japan Ministerial Meeting can aid in that effort, but have the trappings of foreign policy démarches that are partly about curbing the great power’s ambitions in the region. And they are indicative of the key features of India and Japan’s involvement in the Caribbean.
Foreign Policy Démarches
The summit-level meeting between this bloc of Caribbean Basin countries and India took place on November 20, 2024. India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, intent on projecting the South Asian powerhouse as the voice of the Global South, met with his CARICOM counterparts in Guyana.
The two sides agreed on an agenda for the high-level meeting that would “further solidify bilateral cooperation between CARICOM and India in energy and infrastructure, agriculture and food security, health and pharmaceuticals, technology and innovation, as well as human resources and capacity building.” Areas for future cooperation between CARICOM and India are fleshed out in the summit’s Joint Statement.
Bilateral meetings were also held between Prime Minister Modi and some of his counterparts in the margins of the summit, including with Guyanese President Mohamed Irfaan Ali.
More than ever, New Delhi understands that giving a fillip to the further development of the CARICOM-India partnership turns on the two sides “enhanc[ing] coordination of positions on the global international agenda.” For instance, the Joint Statement notes inter alia that the leaders “agreed on the need for comprehensive reforms of the [United Nations] Security Council.” Observers see this text as a nod to India’s longstanding ambition to secure a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC); in this way, cementing qua formalising its ascension within the upper echelons of the international pecking order. (A founding member of the UN, India has served eight times as a non-permanent member of the Security Council.) What is more, the said text points to “efforts to bring about a systematic transition to multipolarity at the United Nations.”
The interaction between the global order and the high-stakes geopolitical manoeuvres of the moment have a wider significance not just for New Delhi, but also Tokyo. It is noteworthy that in the Eighth CARICOM-Japan Ministerial Meeting (held in Japan on December 14, 2024) both sides:
- “Concurred that unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion constitute a challenge to the order, which is the common foundation of our peace and prosperity, and that no country can remain unaffected, making it necessary for Japan and CARICOM to work together and raise their voices in the international arena under the Global Partnership.”
- Underscored that action on UNSC reform is an imperative, undertaking to work closely to this end vis-à-vis their “shared … commitment to multilateralism.”
What comes through are the respective worldviews of New Delhi and Tokyo in respect of a multipolar world, albeit one that is still in the making. In the present breach between this emergent era and the erstwhile unipolar moment, within which a revanchist Russia is now the PRC’s junior partner in the scheme of things, both New Delhi and Tokyo seek inter alia to influence the Caribbean to suit their own interests.
In line with this, New Delhi and Tokyo are inclined to use their respective high-level meetings with CARICOM as opportunities to express convergence of views on international issues of the day and their growing influence in international affairs.
Elevated Relations
Overall, Indian and Japanese foreign policies have elevated their respective relations with and are far more interested in CARICOM. India-CARICOM relations and Japan-CARICOM relations, respectively, have deepened significantly because of the summit and ministerial meeting in question.
It is notable that the stage is set for India — which is heavily reliant on energy imports — to make a play for Guyana’s hydrocarbons, just as that CARICOM member state has become a major contributor to the world’s crude oil supply growth. As India’s energy demand continues to rise at a time when the Indian economy is experiencing rapid growth, for New Delhi, India’s energy security is top of mind. So, too, is Guyana in that regard.
The PRC is also deepening partnerships with Guyana, calling attention to its energy-related interests there. Now, ever mindful of the “strategic elevation” of U.S.-Guyana relations, Beijing contends that Guyana “highly values China’s international influence.”
What’s more, with Japan’s attention called to the Caribbean, Tokyo has a particular interest in investing political capital in the narrative of Japan and CARICOM member states as facing “shared challenges.” The emphasis is on “threats to a free and open international order based on the United Nations Charter and the rule of law in the international community, and the intensification of global challenges, which require a collaborative approach.” Japanese support for CARICOM regarding the Guyana-Venezuela border controversy partly underlies this narrative, which could also be extended to issues of concern (more directly) for Japan vis-à-vis the Korean Peninsula, the Indo-Pacific writ large and more.
New Delhi and Tokyo are also cognizant that to succeed in foreign policy terms, they need to strike a balance between projecting their respective interests and exercising sensitivity regarding the deepening Sino-Caribbean relationship. Table 1 below highlights the extent of Beijing’s diplomatic footprint in CARICOM, which is more extensive than that of India and Japan at the moment. India and Japan are advancing their interests mindful that the PRC is now an important lever in the Caribbean’s developmental trajectory, while CARICOM leaders themselves are a growing, vocal presence in calls to rethink the “West-led” international order.
On the face of it, India and Japan’s recent high-level meetings with CARICOM are routine affairs in the context of diplomatic relations. As the foregoing analysis shows, though, such engagements assume greater importance in the light of great power competition (as opposed to cooperation) that is aiming to forge the post-unipolar moment.
This analysis also illustrates that, with an eye to such geopolitical dynamics and the associated need for these small states to bolster their diplomatic leverage, the CARICOM bloc of countries has held to multi-alignment.
