Donald Trump’s return to the presidency has raised the prospect that, over the next four years, the Caribbean’s playbook regarding its longstanding relations with the U.S. will be tested as never before.
In just under a fortnight, Caribbean Community (CARICOM) leaders will meet in Barbados for a regularly scheduled summit. It is their first summit since Donald Trump, now serving as the 47th U.S. president, returned to the presidency on January 20. And it takes place at a moment when the reality of the “America First” approach to foreign policy has begun to set in for the Caribbean – just like it has for the rest of the world.
That reality will likely weigh heavily on the summit’s agenda, which partly deals with “climate change and the climate finance agenda; the ongoing challenges in Haiti; security issues; digital resilience; external relations matters.” All of this, seen from the broader perspective of political capital, is meant to move the needle on CARICOM member states‘ long-term strategy of amplifying their voice qua negotiating power on the international stage.
Some Initial Foreign Policy-related Reverberations
With the advent of the second Trump presidency, the high-level meeting in question takes on added significance. This is because some of Trump’s political ends have the potential to undermine this bloc’s foreign policy interests.
Of note, with a view to upending Biden era domestic and foreign policy moorings, among the flurry of executive orders that President Trump signed shortly following his assumption of office was one pertaining to the withdrawal of the United States from the landmark Paris Climate Agreement. (His administration also informed the United Nations [UN] of this decision, whose blow was not softened any as the United States has since reneged on its previous multi-billion dollar pledge to the Green Climate Fund.) It is a global framework that the Caribbean regional grouping deems to be pivotal to coordinated, concerted multilateral action to address climate change, which is an existential threat to such Small Island Developing States.
In 2017, during his first term in office, Trump also withdrew the United States from that accord; a directive that the Biden administration subsequently reversed. At the time, and in response, CARICOM voiced its dismay and disappointment in respect of Trump’s decision. It is likely that this time around, too, such sharp disagreement will be forthcoming. That Trump privileges unilateralism over multilateralism, then, is also at issue for CARICOM’s leaders.
Then there are other dynamics at work that Trump 2.0 also ushers in, and much of this impacts CARICOM in geopolitical terms.
Test of a Diplomatic Playbook
Trump’s worldview places an emphasis on “securing America’s borders, stopping illegal and destabilizing migration, and negotiating the repatriation of illegal immigrants.” This has a bearing on Caribbean countries, as regional media houses have recently reported. Some foreign policy analysts have also rightly pointed to the link between the “disruptive nature of climate change [and] large-scale migration flows.” The case of Haitian migrants, who continue to flee Haiti bound for the United States (in the context of a years-long and multifaceted crisis in Haiti), is yet another example of the complexity of migration-related push factors.
In fact, Trump has not let up on his well-documented concerns over Haitian migrants, even though as President-elect he shifted his gaze yet again to another Caribbean country – The Bahamas. Trump’s proposal to deport certain migrants to The Bahamas (among other countries) – which Nassau roundly rejected – offered some telling clues of Washington’s now securitised, zealous approach to delivering on the “America First” approach to foreign policy.
This is particularly true of what U.S. National Security Advisor Mike Waltz recently dubbed Monroe Doctrine 2.0 – a facet of which is seemingly geared towards undermining Panamanian sovereignty on account of Washington’s concerns over “China’s presence” around the Panama Canal.
This leaves open the possibility of Washington becoming more hawkish about the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) growing Belt and Road Initiative’s footprint in CARICOM member states. (This has to be taken into account in light of the high-stakes geopolitical manoeuvres of the moment.) As I noted for India’s World: “the PRC is now an important lever in the Caribbean’s developmental trajectory, while CARICOM leaders themselves are a growing, vocal presence in calls to rethink the ‘West-led’ international order.”
And as the bloc’s leaders continue to figure out the wider implications of Trump 2.0 for their respective countries, drawing on their varied foreign policy experiences relative to his first term and the post-January 20 measures highlighted above, they have a good read on what to expect from Trump’s electoral return to the White House.
And more significantly, for now (not even a month into Trump’s second term), things aren’t getting any better for CARICOM.
Washington has put a stop to funding for the UN Security Council-approved, Kenya-led Multinational Security Support Mission in Haiti. From its outset, this Mission has faced challenges, which are now only likely to worsen. And the stakes are high. Haiti likely cannot withstand the Mission ultimately falling short in operationalizing its mandate. Instructively, a recently released UN report calls attention to the “very alarming” human rights situation in Haiti. For their part, CARICOM leaders have consistently voiced the view that a strong bloc needs a strong Haiti.
It is also noteworthy that the Trump administration’s stance on negotiations to end the Ukraine war raises serious questions surrounding Russian territorial gains at the expense of Ukraine. A host of concerns arise for Guyana and its sister CARICOM countries, which have taken an active interest in the war, as the former state grapples with a border controversy that pits Georgetown against Caracas.
In addition, Trump’s so-called “Gaza takeover plan” is cause for concern, against a backdrop where all 14 independent CARICOM member states support the two-state solution as a diplomatic vehicle for resolving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. (See my analysis here, here and here.)
Furthermore, the Trump administration’s pivot to “Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid”and, allied to this, the administration’s efforts to dismantle the U.S. Agency for International Development have sent shock waves through Caribbean policymaking and civil society circles. Historically, the United States has “provided considerable foreign assistance to the Caribbean” – complemented by security, economic and other ties.
What’s more, CARICOM finds it troubling that international organizations are in the Trump administration’s crosshairs. After all, by and large, such intergovernmental organizations undergird UN-anchored multilateralism. They also have an outsized place in this bloc’s diplomatic playbook, which leverages the web of UN institutions to a significant degree.
To be sure, in part, the foregoing foreign policy démarches of the Trump administration signal the deeper shift from the foreign policy aims of former President Joe Biden’s one-term presidency (which succeeded the first Trump presidency); namely, “bring[ing] a state of normalcy to U.S. foreign policy, rejoin[ing] treaties and alliances the previous administration abandoned, and restor[ing] the country’s standing in the world.”
The Trump administration’s departure from Biden-era U.S. foreign policy positioning is coming at the rest of the international community fast and furious, with some associated actions (sketched above) constituting a wake-up call for all concerned.
Looking Ahead
At their upcoming summit, then, CARICOM leaders will no doubt assess this nascent period of Trump 2.0. More important, they will have to review the bloc’s own past playbook relative to relations with the U.S., with an eye to calibrations over the next four years per their respective countries’ interests. In doing so, at the outset, wary may well be the watchword. Yet the greatest uncertainty in the same vein comes from not concretizing a Trump 2.0 strategy, which diplomats and officials are hard at work fashioning for their political directorate. At their 48th Regular Meeting, CARICOM Heads of Government have an important opportunity to make headway in that regard.
Dr. Nand C. Bardouille is manager of The Diplomatic Academy of the Caribbean in the Institute of International Relations at The University of the West Indies’ (The UWI’s) St. Augustine Campus in Trinidad and Tobago. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of The UWI.
