When America sneezes, the Caribbean catches a cold: terrorism and criminal gangs
I think CARICOM’s leaders’ decision to introduce legislation to categorise criminal gangs as a terrorist organisation is injudicious. Those in power must refrain from labelling everything as “terrorism”. They do so because the word is almost used universally as a pejorative term, but designating criminal gangs as a “terrorist organisation” will undoubtedly create confusion academically, legally and conceptually. This is because terrorism must involve a political dimension – a clear political objective. Therefore, in any reference regarding definitional or conceptual understanding of terrorism, I think distinguished scholar and expert on terrorism, Professor Richard English definition from his 2009 book titled Terrorism: How to Respond perfectly captures what acts of violence and non-violent acts can be classified as terrorism. A definition I refined in my book, Stakeholders of Terrorism and the Caribbean: A Short Case Study in which I defined terrorism as violence or threats employed with political objectives involving a myriad “of acts, of targets, and of actors” that holds a significant psychological dimension, resulting in terror or fear among an intimidated group to garner political communication or achievements, which is best viewed as “subspecies of warfare and therefore it can form part of a wider campaign of violent and non-violent attempts at political leverage” (English, 2009; Quashie, 2023).
As egregious and devilish as the recent spike in gun violence resulting in the high homicide rates across the Caribbean may be, I think there are more appropriate labels to classify them as opposed to calling them an act of terrorism. To designate criminal gangs as terrorist organisations will be incongruous with exiting literature on the subject matter. For the sake of reiteration, terrorism typically involves a political objective. Although no single dimension or factor is sufficient in isolation in offering a holistic explanation of terrorism, most experts/scholars agree that political context is a vital component to the understanding and explanation of terrorism (e.g., Crenshaw, 2001; Cronin, 2002; Hayden, Lansford & Watson, 2003; Charles, 2005; Richardson, 2006; Hoffman, 2006; Wilkinson, 2006; Cronin, 2008; English, 2009; Sandler, 2015; English, 2016).
To create legislation to categorise criminal gangs as terrorist organisations is to place them in the same category with infamous transnational terrorist organisations – like, for example, Al-Qaeda. Yet, even Al-Qaeda use of terroristic violence is not merely to gain a tactical advantage or engage with the enemy in attritional warfare; rather, it is to achieve a political goal. General Sir Mike Jackson (head of the British Army during the 2003 invasion of Iraq) candidly observed: “Al-Qaeda’s end is not terrorism…that is their way of applying the means of violence; its end is the political one of achieving the ascendancy of Islamic fundamentalism” (English, 2009).
What about the Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL)? In contrast to Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State does not see itself as a vanguard fighting to rouse the Muslim world and force the West to withdraw from the Middle East. Rather, it wants to build a state, purify it, and then expand it: it proclaims baqiya wa tatamadad (“lasting and expanding”) as its motto” (Byman, 2015). Again, the use of ISIS terroristic violence is not for criminal endeavours; rather, it is to achieve a political goal. Let us also take the Irish Republican Army (IRA), who also garnered most of its support from the Catholic community, but its main goal was to seek “nationalist self-determination” and not religious aspirations; and although the IRA nationalism has been built on the communal grievances of the Catholic community in Ireland, religion was just part of a broader political story (English, 2009). Here, you have religion playing a vital role in the explanation of terrorism, but it is interwoven with political dimensions – which is typically the goal of terrorist organisations.
Even the Caribbean can learn from its own terrorist history. In 1990, Yasin Abu Bakr and a small religious group (Jamaat-al-Muslimeen) sought to overthrow the government of Trinidad and Tobago in a brief attempted coup on the July 27, 1990, which involved holding the Trinidad government hostage for approximately 6 days before surrendering (Collihan and Danopoulos, 1993). At the time, Yasin Abu Bakr perceived Trinidad to be a sort of dystopian society, an unjust society that was morally corrupted and being led by “evil men” and thus, it was his solemn duty to charter a “new national direction inspired by the will of Allah” (Collihan and Danopoulos, 1993). In 1972, the governments of Jamaica, Barbados, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago had established diplomatic relations with Cuba and the countries also “entered into a joint air services agreement together” to America’s disapproval and in “defiance of an Organization of American States (OAS) sanction” and it was also met with outrage from anti-Castro forces (Phillips, 1990). On October 6, 1976, in retaliation, “a Cubana Airlines civil jetliner, en route on a scheduled flight from Guyana to Havana via Trinidad, Barbados and Jamaica, exploded and crashed in the sea approximately 10 minutes after departure from the Grantley Adams International Airport (then called Seawell) in Barbados, as a result of bombs planted aboard by two members of the CORU (Comando de Organizaciones Revolucionarias Unidas), an anti-Castro terrorist group code-named El Condor” (Phillips, 1990). The terrorist attack resulted in 78 people being killed and introduced the Caribbean nations to the politics of the Cold War. Again, emphasizing the importance of political dimension in any conversation regarding terrorism.
Another important element that must be considered, is the victims of both criminal gangs and terrorists. In the case of the former, criminal gangs victims are usually other gang members, or the victims might be a case of reprisal, tuff wars, and sometimes it might involve an innocent bystander who happened to get caught in a crossfire. The innocent victim, however, is not use in the same manner that terrorists use victims because when terrorists use violence against victims, they seek to convey their message to a wider audience beyond the targeted victims – such as constituents and potential recruits. Moreover, targeted victims are usually unarmed, and the randomness of the attacks means anyone at anytime and anywhere could be a victim of terrorism (Post, 2007). Therefore, terroristic violence is sometimes deployed as a strategy in which the terroristic violence is used against victims to reach a wider audience, with the aim of achieving a political goal, as a particular species of political violence or psychological warfare. However, I am not writing this article to bore you with the literature on terrorism.
I am writing it out of concern regarding the decision to introduce legislation to categorise criminal gangs as terrorist groups. It is true that when America sneezes, the Caribbean catches a cold. This new shift in the region’s approach to combating violent crime is seemingly following in the footsteps of US President Donald Trump signed an Executive Order on January 20, 2025, designating international cartels (the Cartels) and other organizations as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations, consistent with section 219 of the INA (8 U.S.C. 1189), or Specially Designated Global Terrorists, consistent with IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702) and Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001 (Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism). . .” (The White House, 2025). Like the CARICOM leader’s decision to categorise criminal gangs as terrorist organisations, Trump’s designation will have academic and legal implications. Moreover, it may also allow for the use of the USA PATRIOT Act and certain kinetic tactics under the guise of US elusive War on Terror policy. It is an Act aimed to “deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world” by providing intelligence and law enforcement officials with the tools needed to help them identify, dismantle, disrupt and punish terrorists before they can strike. Hence, the legal implications. The academic implications are plentiful, some of which are explored in this article.
Terrorism and organised crime are separate unlawful activities and should be dealt with as such. The overuse of terrorism even for the most heinous of crimes will be rendered meaningless and it will create unnecessary confusion both in the academic and legal realm. I agree that the burgeoning violent crimes permeating the Caribbean needs to be dealt with and dealt with forthwith. The designation of criminal gangs as terrorist organisations is not one of them. There are brilliant scholars from the region who can offer practical solutions and best practices to combating violent crime problem in our region – such as Professor Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, Professor Anthony Harriot, among others.
I do agree, however, that we need a War on Crime policy and not simply emulate Bush’s elusive War on Terror policy to combat our exploding violent crime problem. In fact, the region has already implemented counter-terrorism policies because of the War on Terror ranging from terrorism financing to combating Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) from the region. More importantly, the War on Terror that was launched following the heinous terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 (often abbreviated as 9/11) has not even achieved its goal: to “seek out and stop terrorists around the world”. Actually, for the most part, the opposite has been achieved. For example, terrorist groups like the Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL) did not exist before the War on Terror. The psychological tortures at Guantanamo Bay detention in Cuba and Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq as part of the War on Terror also served as propaganda material and recruitment tool for ISIS. I do not want us to make the same mistakes in creating an environment for criminal gangs to exploit or the space for homegrown violent extremism, or even transnational terrorist groups to use as part of their radicalisation and recruitment tools. With that said, I am in full support of making amendments to our criminal codes by passing legislations that make provision for harsher penalties for violent crimes. Corruption in law enforcement agencies must be dealt with forthwith, and a witness protection programme should be implemented in countries that have not done so as yet and fully enforced in those countries that have such programmes. Law enforcement officials must work with the community to gather intelligence, but this would require building trust between the police and the public. I highly recommend conducting research on public’s perception on policing to have a better understanding of the public’s perception of our nation’s police force. Lastly, all stakeholders (government, lawmakers, private sector, NGOs and citizens) must support our police forces who risk their lives engaging in combat operations against violent criminals who are destroying our communities, ruining lives, terrorising (no pun intended) our streets and causing calamitous damage to our region’s international reputation as a peaceful, warm and friendly tourism destination. A destination to live in harmony and invest.
